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5THE MILITARY ROLE IN INTERNAL DEFENSE AND SECURITY:
SOME PROBLEMS
María José Moyano Rasmussen
A key issue in the post-Cold War world is whether military forces should be deployed
in domestic law enforcement missions. Advocates of military involvement in domestic
law enforcement see it as a useful strategy for avoiding immediate force reductions. In
many new democracies this practice is not even questioned. Due to the traditional
involvement of the military in law enforcement missions, when violence breaks out
policy-makers and society-at-large assume that the military should be brought in.
This paper will analyze some of the difficulties that emerge when the military is
employed in domestic law enforcement. It discusses the American military's involvement
in riot control in Los Angeles in 1992, the British military's thirty-year experience of riot
control and counter-terrorism in Northern Ireland, and some lessons we derive from these
two cases. In Los Angeles and Britain, public officials deployed the military in law
enforcement missions as an act of desperation, without giving much thought to the impact
that these decisions might have on military organizations, democratic practices, and the
orderly functioning of civilian law enforcement agencies.
This paper is organized into four sections. Section I describes the conditions that led
to military involvement in Los Angeles and analyzes the performance of the military
during that crisis. Section II does the same for Northern Ireland. Section III draws
common lessons from the performance of the military in both cases, and concludes that
the military were not ideally suited to these missions, which should have been performed
by a well-trained police force. Finally, Section IV draws some lessons on the behavior of
civilians during these crises, and provides some options for those interested in
establishing a sound and democratic public order policy.
6I. Military Involvement in Riot Control: The Los Angeles Riots, 1992
The Los Angeles riots of 1992, or the “Rodney King” riots, were catalyzed by the
acquittal of four white Los Angeles Police Department (LAPD) officers, who were on
trial for savagely beating King, an African-American. A private citizen videotaped the
incident, which took place on March 3, 1991. An edited version of the videotape was
constantly broadcast on national television during the twelve months that elapsed
between the beating and the beginning of the officers’ trial. The televised version omitted
footage that showed King resisting arrest and attacking one of the police officers. The
jury at the officers’ trial viewed the complete videotape and found it exculpatory.1 On the
basis of the televised version, the citizens of Los Angeles, the American public and
public officials including President George Bush, expected convictions.
The verdict in the “Rodney King trial” was announced on Wednesday, April 29,
1992, at 3.15 PM. One hour later, the rioting began. Even though the verdict precipitated
the riots, there were two other factors that contributed to the violence: the killing of
Latasha Harlins, and social conditions in South Central Los Angeles. Harlins, a black
adolescent, was shot in the back of the head by Soon Ja Du; a Korean shop owner who
thought Harlins wanted to steal a carton of orange juice. In October 1991, Du was
convicted of voluntary manslaughter. Even though she faced a maximum of 11 years in
prison and an additional five for using a gun, the judge freed her on a suspended
sentence. The disposition of the Harlins case convinced many blacks in Los Angeles that
they could not obtain justice through the legal system, and this view became reinforced
by the verdict in the King trial. The hostility between blacks and Koreans, palpable
                                                 
1 There were other factors that explain the acquittals. The jury was given a full account of the incident,
which the American public never had. Mr. King had been driving at 115 miles an hour on the freeway, and
at 85 miles an hour in residential areas. He had ignored several requests to stop by the California Highway
Patrol. He was also intoxicated and his urine showed traces of an analogue of marijuana. For a description
of the King incident and the videotape see Lou Cannon, Official Negligence. How Rodney King and the
Riots Changed Los Angeles and the LAPD (New York: Random House, 1997), chapter 2. The officers’
trial is described in chapters 8 – 10.
7during the Harlins trial, erupted in the riots: 1,867 of the 3,000 businesses destroyed or
looted in the riots were Korean.2
Latasha Harlins was killed in South Central, the Los Angeles district that became
the epicenter of the riots. South Central was an area “awash in poverty, drugs, and
violence.”3 The district presented the usual characteristics of inner cities: unemployment,
family breakdown, exodus of the middle class, increase in violent crime. What
distinguished South Central and other inner city districts of Los Angeles county was the
presence of a large number of heavily armed gangs. The “hard policing” tactics of the
LAPD, while somewhat effective against the criminal fraternity, had alienated the law-
abiding population of South Central.4
The city leadership and the LAPD leadership were totally unprepared for the riots.
The Mayor of Los Angeles, Tom Bradley, and the LAPD Chief, Daryl Gates, expected
guilty verdicts (as did everyone else), so they saw no reason to do any contingency
planning. Bradley and Gates were also engaged in a personal feud. By the time of the
riots, they had not talked to each other in 13 months.5 This was a serious problem, since
the LAPD is ultimately accountable to the mayor. When the verdicts were announced,
Mayor Bradley left his post to attend a rally at a black church, intended to launch
“Operation Cool Response.” This was a well-intended initiative, the brainchild of the
Reverend Cecil Murray, designed to appeal to blacks to channel their frustration through
conventional political means.6 However, it came too late, since the rioters were already
taking to the streets. “Cool Response” should have been launched three or four days
earlier. The jury in the King trial had been deliberating for six days (since April 23),
                                                 
2 Cannon, p.366. See also pp.334 and 336. The killing of Latasha Harlins is described in Cannon, chapter 5,
and the trial of Soon Ja Du in chapter 7.
3 Cannon, p.278.
4 On social conditions in South Central and the activities of gangs, see Cannon, chapter 1, and James D.
Delk, Fires & Furies. The L.A. Riots (Palm Springs, CA: ETC Publications, 1995), chapter 1. Major
General Delk was the National Guard’s Military Field Commander during the riots and prior to
federalization.
5 William M. Mendel, Combat in Cities: The LA Riots and Operation Rio (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Foreign
Military Studies Office, 1996). Available at http://call.army.mil/call/fmso/fmsopubs/issues/rio.htm (May
25, 1999), p.5.
6 Cannon, p.252.
8which in itself was a sign that guilty verdicts were not a certainty. Chief Gates’ conduct
was even more inexcusable. When the riots broke out, the Chief left his post to attend a
political fund–raiser.7
The LAPD was in no position to face the rioters. Most of the senior officers
(captains) in the different divisions were away from their desks, on a three-day course
outside Los Angeles.8 Shifts in many divisions changed at 3 PM, so when the verdicts
were announced, the LAPD had a total of 838 officers on duty.9 These officers had no
civil disturbance equipment, no reserve ammunition, and no riot control plan. The only
LAPD unit that had undertaken minimal riot control training was the elite Metropolitan
Division. However, “Metro had 233 officers, less than 3 percent of the LAPD’s sworn
personnel.”10 In addition, on the day the riots began, Metro officers were told to report to
duty at 6 PM, by which time the riots were in full swing.11 The riots started as two
separate incidents of vandalism. Individuals involved in both incidents converged on the
intersection of Florence and Normandie avenues, in South Central. Thirty police officers
in 18 patrol cars responded to the disturbance. At Florence and Normandie, these 30
officers confronted a crowd of some 200 people throwing bricks, pieces of concrete and
other improvised missiles. A decisive show of force might have stopped the riots at this
juncture.12 Standard riot control doctrine, in the LAPD and elsewhere, calls for the
cordoning off of the intersection with patrol cars. Properly equipped with riot gear, and in
sufficient strength, police then lock arms and advance. However, at 5.45 PM the LAPD
abandoned the intersection. While the riots spread and the local television stations
                                                 
7 Cannon, p.298. Ironically, the purpose of the political gathering was to combat attempts to bring the
LAPD under greater civilian control.
8 Cannon, p.252.
9 Cannon, p.265. This was unforgivable, since the LAPD had been given 2 hours’ advance warning that the
verdicts would be announced. By contrast, a year later, when the officers involved in the King beating were
tried a second time and the verdicts were announced, “[s] me 3,200 LAPD officers were on the streets, ten
times normal patrol strength. The Los Angeles County Sheriff’s Department deployed 1,400 officers, four
times normal, and 600 National Guardsmen assembled on standby at local armories.” Cannon, p.485.
10 Cannon, p.269.
11 Cannon, p.294.
12 This is one of the central themes of Cannon’s book. See for example pp.293, 326-327, 593, and fn.58,
p.645.
9showed live images shot from helicopters, LAPD officers assembled at an emergency
command post that had no televisions, no computers, and few radios or telephones.13
Given the LAPD’s initial paralysis, standard procedure called for the implementation of
the Mutual Aid system. “Mutual aid in California is a well-designed system of law
enforcement officers helping neighboring law enforcement jurisdictions when situations
escalate beyond local capabilities.”14 Mutual aid agreements between law enforcement
agencies and other emergency services dictate that if a particular sheriff or police
department or fire department is overtaken by events, the state Office of Emergency
Services coordinates the provision of reinforcements from other jurisdictions. However,
having failed to take any precautions against rioting, civilian officials panicked and
overreacted. Mayor Bradley and the governor of California, Pete Wilson, circumvented
the Mutual Aid system and called in military forces. Two thousand California National
Guard soldiers were mobilized that evening, and an additional 2,000 were mobilized on
the second day of rioting, April 30.15
The National Guard is a uniquely American organization. Guard u its are funded
at the federal level and are considered part of the military reserves. But they work for the
state governors. Also, a small portion of the Guard officer corps has full-time military
jobs. The vast majority of Guard personnel lead civilian lives and perform military duties
and training during short periods each year.
As this narrative will argue, the Los Angeles riots should have been met by a
well-trained police force. Soldiers did not necessarily represent the best response to this
crisis. However, if soldiers were going to be employed at all, it can be said that
guardsmen were the soldiers best suited to this task, for a number of reasons. First, the
initial 2,000 mobilized lived in the neighborhoods affected by the riots, and were familiar
with the terrain. Second, many of these citizen soldiers held civilian jobs in law
enforcement or related areas. Third, the California National Guard has vast institutional
                                                 
13 Cannon, pp.309-312.
14 Delk, p.296. See also pp. 20-21, 38, 76, 33.
15 Delk, p.62.
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experience responding to emergencies, such as fires or floods, always in aid of civilian
law enforcement. Finally, many of the older guardsmen had been deployed during the
Watts riots of 1965, also in Los Angeles.16  However, guardsmen were not given a chance
to do their job.  On the third day of rioting, May 1, President Bush authorized the
deployment of Regular Army troops and Marines, and federalized the California National
Guard. By May 2, 10,465 guardsmen, 2,023 Army soldiers and 1,508 marines were in
Los Angeles, in addition to 1,717 other federal law enforcement officers.17
This massive deployment of troops was unnecessary because the rioting was over
after the first night. During the second day (Thursday, April 30) the rioting gave way to
massive looting. There was only sporadic looting and violence during the third day
(Friday, May 1).18 By the time federal forces arrived in Los Angeles on Saturday, May 2,
the problem was not the restoration of order but the maintenance of order. Thousands of
troops stood by waiting to be assigned missions. This is not meant to suggest that the
human and financial costs of the riots were not enormous, or that the police officers,
firemen and soldiers did not face great dangers. The statistics in Table 1 are clear. Rather,
the argument here is that troop commitment was excessive, particularly in view of the
fact that the Mutual Aid system had hardly been invoked.
                                                 
16 On the suitability of guardsmen for this mission see Delk, passim; Christopher M. Schnaubelt, “Lessons
in Command and Control from the Los Angeles Riots,” Parameters, Summer 1997, pp.88-109. Available at
http://carlisle-www.army.mil/usawc/Parameters/97summer/schnau.htm (September 4, 2000). See also
Robin Higham (ed.), Bayonets in the Streets. The Use of Troops in Civil Disturbances (Manhattan, KS:
Sunflower University Press, 1989); and Center for Army Lessons Learned, Operatio s otherthan War.
Volume III. Civil Disturbance – L.A. Riots, Chapter 2. Available at http://call.army.mil/call/newsltrs/93-
7/937ch2.htm (December 23, 1998). California National Guard troops were placed on duty for the first
weekend of the new millennium, in case essential services such as electricity or water suffered computer
malfunctions. See Kevin Howe, “National Guard gets Y2K watch on New Year’s,” The Monterey County
Herald, September 5, 1999, p.1.
17 Mendel, p.3 and Delk, p.172. To federalize the National Guard means to place the Guard, which is a
reserve component and also a state militia, under the active component chain of command. Federalization
created a number of legal complications. Since these are peculiar to the United States and shed no light on
the central issues analyzed here, they will not be discussed. See Serban Lungu, “The Employment of the
Armed Forces in Cases of Political or Social Violence: A Comparison Between the United States and
Romania.” M.A. Thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, December 1998, Chapter V.
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Table 1 – The Toll of the Los Angeles Riots, 1992
Date Deaths Injuries Fire Responses
Wednesday April 29 10 n/a 601
Thursday April 30 21 1,000 (cumulative
Apr.29-30)
3,244
Friday May 1 12 257 1,172
Saturday May 2 4 859 517
Sunday May 3 4 267 5,579
Monday May 4 3 n/a n/a
Source: James D. Delk, Fires and Furies. The L.A. Riots (Palm Springs, CA: ETC Publications, 1995),
pp.46, 95, 138, 180, 222.
In addition, all of the missions assigned to military troops were strictly law
enforcement missions – i.e., tasks normally performed by police officers (and which the
LAPD should have been able to perform had it been properly equipped and trained.)
Guardsmen, soldiers and marines patrolled neighborhoods not yet affected by the
violence, to prevent the spread of the riots, and protected shopping malls under threat of
arson or looting. They stopped looting in progress at some stores, and provided protection
against further looting. They protected the post office when postal workers handed out
welfare checks, and escorted firefighters who went out on missions. Guardsmen also
directed traffic and accompanied police detectives as they recovered some of the loot.19
Military troops performed all these missions with enormous restraint, and earned
the recognition of the citizens and public officials of Los Angeles.20 However, these were
not missions for which the military were adequately trained or equipped. This was the
assessment of Major General Marvin L. Covault, commander of all military forces in Los
Angeles, who sought to extricate his troops from the city almost from the moment he got
there.21
                                                                                                                                      
18 Cannon, pp.337-338; Delk, pp.135, 162, 180.
19 Many stores in Los Angeles are equipped with video cameras. The looters never stopped to think how
easy it would be to identify them and prosecute them. For detailed accounts of the tasks performed by
guardsmen, soldiers and marines, see Delk, passim.
20 See Cannon, p.345, and Delk, pp.235, 328.
21 See Delk, pp.235, 305, 320.
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There were several reasons why the military were not ideally suited to these
missions. Unlike the LAPD or the Los Angeles County Sheriff’s Department, soldiers,
marines and guardsmen from Northern California were unfamiliar with Los Angeles
neighborhoods and were not even equipped with adequate city maps.22 Their ilitary
radios were not suited to a city environment.23 Their intelligence estimates were flawed
because police intelligence, which relies heavily on informers and community contacts,
was alien to them.24 More important, the troops did not know “how to recognize ‘the
enemy.’”25 They were uncomfortable in the role of mediators between Korean shop
owners, armed to the teeth and threatening to shoot anyone who approached their
businesses, and the crowds. The troops had little knowledge of gangs and found it
difficult to distinguish between gang members and simple adolescents with an attitude.26
Above all, the troops were unfamiliar with the inner city environment and its
crime problem. On average, there are four murders per day in Los Angeles county,
“where death by gunfire per 100,000 inhabitants is more than triple the national
average.”27 On numerous occasions while they were on patrol between May 2 and May 7,
troops suffering verbal abuse by gang members or hearing shots in the distance thought
they were in imminent danger, only to be told by police officers that crime and violence
levels were much lower than normal.28 On another occasion, marines accompanied police
officers responding to a domestic dispute. On receiving a request to “cover me,” the
marines fired over 200 bullets into a house where there were children.29 Th  probl m on
this occasion was one of vocabulary as well as training: in police parlance, “cover me”
means “have your weapon ready and prepare to fire only if I am in danger;” whereas in
                                                 
22 Center for Army Lessons Learned, Chapter 7. Available at http://call.army.mil/call/newsltrs/93-
7/937ch7.htm (December 23, 1998), p.2, and Chapter 4. Available at http://call.army.mil/call/newsltrs/93-
7/937ch4.htm (December 23, 1998), p.1.
23 Mendel, p.7.
24 Delk, pp.97, 323. On police intelligence as it applies to riots, see Her Majesty’s Inspectorate of
Constabulary, Keeping the Peace. Policing Disorder (London: HMSO, 1999), and Metropolitan Police
Service, New Scotland Yard, Public Order Intelligence Unit. Available at
http://www.met.police.uk/police/mps/1hq/co11/1hqpu2.htm (September 2, 1999).
25 Delk, p.135.
26 See Delk, pp.15, 95, 129.
27 Delk, pp.16-17. See also p.336.
28 See Delk, pp.167, 222, 241, 243.
29 Delk, pp.221-222.
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marine parlance, “cover me” means “open fire at once.” This points to the most important
difference between military troops and police officers. Police officers are trained to
respond to crime and violence with the minimum force necessary to accomplish the task.
This principle of minimum force is alien to a soldier.
Every guardsman, soldier and marine deployed in Los Angeles had to sign a copy
of very restrictive Rules of Engagement, in order to acknowledge his/her understanding
and acceptance of these rules. The Rules of Engagement dictate, for any military
operation, the conditions under which force will be used. During the Los Angeles riots,
the Rules of Engagement stated that:
The use of deadly force is authorized only where all three of the following circumstances
are present:
a) all other means have been exhausted …
b) the risk of death or serious bodily harm to innocent persons is not significantly
increased …
c) the purpose of its use is one or more of the following:
1) Self-defense …
2) Prevention of a crime …
3) Defense of others …
4) Detention or prevention of the escape of persons …30
To indicate that deadly force can be used after “all other means have been
exhausted” implies that non-lethal weapons were available to military troops, but this was
not the case. Some, but not all troops were equipped with riot batons and face shields. No
other standard, non-lethal riot and crowd control means (water cannon, tear gas, rubber
bullets or dogs) were available.31 Nor had military troops (with the exception of some
Guard units) trained in the use of these non-lethal weapons. In practice, the soldiers,
                                                 
30 Delk, pp.341-342.
31 Delk, pp.112, 303. On pp.327-328 Delk states that 1,000 canisters of tear gas were available, but were
not used because tear gas “impacts upon the innocent as well as the guilty.” But tear gas will not kill the
innocent. Live ammunition might. See also Colonel Michael Dewar, War in the Streets. The Story of Urban
Combat from Calais to Khafji (Newton Abbot, Devon: David & Charles, 1992), chapter 10, especially
pp.123-130.
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marines and guardsmen had few options other than the use of deadly force. Table 2
shows the Arming Orders, which dictate what equipment and/or weaponry will be used in
a given military operation.
Table 2 – Arming Orders during the Los Angeles Riots
Arming
Order




AO-1 Sling Scabbard Holstered Belt In pouch/
Empty
OIC/NCO
AO-2 Port Scabbard Holstered Belt In pouch/
Empty
OIC/NCO
AO-3 Sling Fixed Holstered Hand In pouch/
Empty
OIC/NCO
AO-4 Port Fixed Holstered Hand In pouch/
Empty
OIC/NCO
AO-5 Port Fixed Holstered Hand In weapon/
Empty
OIC/NCO




OIC= Officer in charge
NCO= Noncommissioned officer in charge
Source: James D. Delk, Fires and Furies. The L.A. Riots (Palm Springs, CA: ETC Publications, 1995),
p.343.
Between Thursday (April 30) and Saturday (May 2), the California National
Guard patrolled the streets fully armed, at Arming Order 5. This changed with the arrival
of federal forces, when General Covault ordered all troops to change to Arming Order 1,
which made it more difficult for the soldiers to use lethal force. This decision has been
heavily criticized, on the grounds that it put soldiers at risk and impacted morale.32
However, General Covault made a wise and courageous decision. His decision was
courageous because it put his troops at risk, and wise because it likely averted bloodshed.
                                                 
32 For discussions of the controversy over arming orders see Delk, pp.198-202, 320-323. See also Mendel,
pp.4-7, and Center for Army Lessons Learned, Chapter 8. Av ilable at http://call.army.mil/call/newsltrs/93-
7/937ch8.htm (December 23, 1998).
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His soldiers confronted heavily armed gang members. But they also confronted crowds
armed only with bottles or rocks; adolescents and children; looters who lived below the
poverty line and who were committing a crime out of desperation; and irresponsible
citizens out for thrills who wanted to photograph the action. What is the adequate
response? How does one chose between the prevention of crime, the preservation of order
and the preservation of life? Police officers are trained to make these choices on a daily
basis, and are also trained to react to street conditions in ways that soldiers are not. This
was recognized by National Guard commander General James Delk, who told his troops
to “listen to your [police] counterpart, they know the territory and the threat.”33 The
military intervention in the Los Angeles riots could have resulted in a bloodbath.
Deploying soldiers in the streets armed with rifles and bayonets does not allow for a
gradual escalation of the state’s response. What is a soldier to do but shoot after he has
issued his warning to looters? That the military intervention in Los Angeles did not result
in the death of many civilians is due to Covault’s decision to expose his soldiers, as well
as to the restraint shown by those men.
It must be pointed out that decisions on the Rules of Engagement were left to all
intents and purposes in the hands of the military, and the enforcement of those Rules of
Engagement was at best haphazard. The Rules of Engagement and Arming Orders were
devised by Generals Delk and Covault. Both senior officers based themselves on existing
Department of Defense operational plans and regulations. Since civilian officials have at
some point approved these plans and regulations, it could be said that there was some
civilian input, albeit indirect. But there is no evidence that civilians in California (the
mayor or the governor) provided any input or evinced any interest in the issue of the
Rules of Engagement or how these were enforced. There is also substantial evidence that
during the riots different units operated at different arming levels, in spite of Covault’s
orders, and that this was widely known at the time. Considering that the likely outcome
was the civilian loss of life, this issue constitutes a serious indictment of the civilian
leadership of Los Angeles.
                                                 
33 Delk, p.199.
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In fact, one constant in the military intervention in Los Angeles was that the
military operated by and large devoid of any civilian control. This was not the military’s
fault. The military were obliged to make decisions that should have been made by
civilian law enforcement or political leaders, because of the lack of any civilian
coordination, or of an established law enforcement chain of command.
In 1980, city authorities in Los Angeles passed an ordinance that created an
Emergency Operations Plan. According to this plan, an Emergency Operations
Organization (EOO), headed by the mayor and with representatives from every major
city agency, was supposed to plan for contingencies such as riots before they occurred.
The EOO was also expected to assume command of operations once an emergency
developed. Before and during the 1992 riots, the EOO “should have been the nerve center
of the City’s emergency response. In this case, however, the EOO was dysfunctional.”34
Many city officials were unfamiliar with the emergency legislation, and therefore
unaware that they had a role to play. When, in agreement with the Emergency Operations
Plan, the mayor opened an Emergency Operations Center in the basement of City Hall,
many city officials who should have been involved were unaware of this development. In
addition, since the Emergency Operations Center did not have adequate communication
with the outside world, it could hardly issue orders or respond to events as they unfolded.
Therefore, the military were left with no choice but to respond to ad hoc requests from
law enforcement officers in the field, and to exercise their own initiative.
Civilian officials in California called in the military because they perceived the
LAPD was incapable of providing a response, and then completely abdicated their
responsibility and left the military to fend for themselves. To some extent, this was a
problem of leadership. But the LAPD's shortcomings were also the result of long-term
trends for which officials and citizens of California bear responsibility. In 1978,
California voters approved Proposition 13, a measure that froze property taxes and
drastically reduced funds available for public services. Over the next fifteen years, the
                                                 
34  The City in Crisis. A Report by the Special Advisor to the Board of Police Commissioners on the Civil
Disorders in Los Angeles (Washington, D.C.: The Police Foundation, 1992), p.24.
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LAPD appealed to city officials and to the voters, but though everyone wanted improved
police services, nobody was willing to pay for them. As a consequence, by the time of the
riots the LAPD had less than two officers per 1,000 inhabitants, which is under half the
ratio in other large cities. LAPD training facilities were in disrepair, training standards
had collapsed, and the force suffered equipment shortages and malfunctions.35 It sho ld
also be said that the LAPD, devoid of any meaningful civilian control, had lost all
legitimacy among the population of South Central.36 R so ting to the military in order to
quell disorders has one added disadvantage. The military can become a crutch that
absolves civilian officials from the responsibility of providing for and overseeing the
work of the police and its relations with the community it is expected to serve and
protect. Some of these issues will be developed further in the concluding sections.
II. Military Involvement in Counter-terrorism: The British Army in
Northern Ireland, 1969-2000
The Irish have been fighting British domination for 300 years. In 1921, this led to
the partition of the island and eventually to the creation of an independent Republic of
Ireland in the south. The six counties of Northern Ireland (also known as Ulster) remain
part of the United Kingdom to this day. For fifty years following partition, Ulster voters
elected representatives to a local parliament known as Stormont, as well as to the British
parliament in London. Catholics, who constituted one third of the population of Northern
Ireland in the 1960s, labored under severe discrimination. “Demands for reform centred
particularly on local government where gerrymandering had ensured Unionist control
even in boroughs like the city of Derry with a Catholic majority. Catholics were sharply
discriminated against in the allocation of local authority jobs and housing, and even the
local franchise … gave businessmen (who were usually Protestant) additional votes
                                                 
35 See Cannon, passim.
36 Lack of civilian control remains a problem for all those police forces organized around the principle of
police independence. See Kevin Flynn, "Mayor Backs New Plan on Police Review Board," The New Y rk
Times, August 11, 1999, p.A21; and Charles Townshend, Making the Peace. Public Order and Public
Security in Modern Britain (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993), chapters 7 and 9.
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according to the value of their property.”37 (Political language in Northern Ireland
differentiates between Protestants, unionists and loyalists. A Protestant is someone raised
in that religion. Most, but not all, Protestants are unionists, which means they favor the
union with the United Kingdom. Loyalists are those unionists who advocate or practice
violence in order to further their cause. A similar distinction exists between Catholics,
nationalists and republicans. Catholics are individuals raised in that religion. Most
Catholics are nationalists, which means they want the reunification of Ireland, north and
south. Republicans are those nationalists who advocate or practice violence in order to
achieve this end.)
In 1967, Catholics formed the Northern Ireland Civil Rights Association (NICRA) in
order to campaign against discrimination. Encouraged by lengthy coverage in the
international media, NICRA thrived. Protestants, who dominated the Stormont
parliament, tenaciously clung to their privileges, and interpreted the mildest demand for
reform as an assault on the constitutional order. Street violence escalated rapidly in 1968-
1969, between Catholics and Protestants and Catholics and the police, mainly drawn from
the Protestant community. Demonstrations, counter-demonstrations, petrol bombs, and
barricades became a daily occurrence. It was felt that the local police, the Royal Ulster
Constabulary (RUC), could not cope with the disorders.  Two factors gave rise to
misgivings.  First it was recognized that the RUC was severely under-staffed.  Second,
there were doubts about the RUC’s political neutrality.  Television crews had captured
images of the RUC siding with Protestant demonstrators against the Catholics.
After one night of rioting (August 14-15, 1969) left 10 civilians dead and another 145
wounded,38 the British government decided to send in the army: “The General Officer
Commanding Northern Ireland [the GOC] has been instructed to take all necessary steps,
acting impartially between citizen and citizen, to restore law and order. Troops will be
                                                 
37 Keith Jeffery, “The British Army and Ireland since 1922,” in Thomas Bartlett and Keith Jeffery (eds.), A
Military History of Ireland (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), p.450. For an analysis of
discrimination, and of Catholic attempts to fight it in the 1960s, see J. Bowyer Bell, The Irish Troubles. A
Generation of Violence 1967-1992 (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1993), chapters 1-2.
38 Tony Geraghty, The Irish War (London: HarperCollins, 1998), p.22.
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withdrawn as soon as this is accomplished.”39  T irty years later, the troops are still there,
though their duties changed dramatically – from public order to counter-terrorism – after
the first three years.
In August 1969 the British army took to the streets of Belfast and Derry to separate
the two warring tribes, and to protect the Catholics from the ferocity of the Protestants.
The army also engaged in a number of community activities. It organized sporting events
for young people, ran discos, even helped the elderly with household chores.40 T rough
patient negotiation with community leaders, the army managed to “talk down” the
barricades that Catholics and Protestants had erected to protect their neighborhoods from
the opposing side. But as soon as a barricade went down, another one came up. The
barricades “created areas of virtual self-government.”41 The xistence of these barricades
allowed the terrorist organizations, which had stagnated for years, to reorganize and
rearm. The barricades came finally down in 1972 as a result of Operation Motorman, the
largest British military operation since the Korean War. By this time, an effective
program of reform had appeased NICRA. Riots have occasionally erupted over the years,
but they have never again been the daily occurrence they were in 1969-1972. Therefore,
by 1972 the army’s main concern was no longer public order but terrorism, primarily by
the Irish Republican Army (IRA), and to a lesser extent by the loyalist Ulster Defense
Association (UDA) and smaller groups.42
During this period, the army’s relationship with the Catholics also changed
dramatically.  “When the British Army arrived on the streets of Northern Ireland in 1969
                                                 
39 Desmond Hamill, Pigin the Middle. The Army in Northern Ireland 1969-1985 (London: Methuen,
1986), p.7.
40 See Hamill, pp.29-30 and Colonel Michael Dewar, The British Army in Northern Ireland (London: Arms
and Armour Press, 1997), pp.33-38, 49. The army has continued to engage in community activities over the
years. For a recent example see Karen Moseley, “Hitting the right note,” Soldier, December 1998.
Available at http://www.army.mod.uk/army/life/magazine/dec98/feat1.htm (August 13, 1999).
41 Martin Dillon, The Dirty War. Covert Strategies and Tactics Used in Political Conflicts (New York:
Routledge, 1999), p.xliii.
42 The IRA and UDA are the two largest organizations, though there are smaller ones on both sides of the
political divide. On republican and loyalist terrorism see Bell, pa sim; Tim Pat Coogan, The I.R.A.
(London: Fontana Books, 1982); Brendan O’Brien, The Long War. The IRA and Sinn Fein 1985 to Today
(Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press, 1995); Peter Taylor, Loyalists: War and Peace in Northern
Ireland (New York: TV Books, 1999).
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in response to pleas from Catholic politicians, in traditional Republican areas soldiers
were welcomed much like the troops who arrived to liberate Paris in 1944.”43
Photographs and television news coverage of British soldiers on patrol in Belfast and
Derry in 1969 depict an endless stream of Catholic housewives bringing them tea and
muffins. This relationship was soured in July 1970, when the army decided to impose a
three-day curfew in the Catholic enclave of Falls Road in Belfast, in response to a tip-off
that there were arms hidden there.  The whole area was cordoned off. Citizens were
confined to their homes without access to basic staples such as bread and milk while the
army looked for weapons. The house searches uncovered a not insignificant number of
guns and explosives, but in street clashes with demonstrators, the army killed four
civilians and injured 68. Whether the operation could be considered a military success, in
terms of the number of weapons seized, is open to question. In political terms, it was a
disaster, as well as a turning point in the army’s relationship with the Catholics. As one
soldier remembers, “[t]he week before the curfew, I’d actually marched my troops
unarmed into the Falls to a Catholic church to go to church to show that we had
confidence in [the Catholics]. We were unarmed and we marched down the road and into
the church. A week later, it was a reverse situation. I don’t believe the Army would have
marched down since that day, unarmed down the road.”44
A second event that damaged the army's relationship with the Catholic population
was the introduction of internment without trial (indefinite detention without charges) in
August 1971. The decision to introduce internment was made by the Stormont and British
governments, but it was the army that executed it poorly. Internment was a failure for
several reasons. Intelligence gathering by the RUC was deficient. Rumors about
internment had been floating around Belfast for months. Lieutenant General Harry Tuzo,
GOC Northern Ireland, had even discussed the pros and cons of internment in an
interview with the B lfast Telegraph. Therefore, when internment came, the real gunmen
                                                 
43 Dillon, p.24.
44 Lieutenant Colonel John Charteris, stationed in Northern Ireland 1970-1972, interviewed for the PBS
Frontline documentary #1603, “The IRA and Sinn Fein,” aired October 21, 1997. A transcript of the entire
documentary is available at http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/ira/ (July 27, 1999). The
statement by Charteris is on p.8 of the transcript. On the Falls curfew see also Hamill, pp.37-40; Peter
Taylor, Behind the Mask. The IRA and Sinn Fein (New York: TV Books, 1997), pp.98-103.
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were in hiding. Internment was also seen as biased, since there was no Protestant among
the 346 persons lifted initially. Soon there were rumors of the army’s ill- r atment of
internees during interrogation.45 The army made its third serious mistake on January 30,
1972, when soldiers of the Parachute Regiment killed 13 unarmed civilians during a
demonstration against internment in Derry, an incident which became known as “Bloody
Sunday” and which has never been properly investigated or explained.46
The combined effect of the Falls curfew, internment and “Bloody Sunday” was to
drive Catholic moderates into the arms of the IRA. In fact, it could be said that the army
confronted after 1972 an enemy of its own making. In 1969, when the army was sent to
Northern Ireland, the Catholics were fighting to end discrimination, not to gain
independence from Britain. It was to a large extent the behavior of the army, described in
the preceding paragraphs, which nurtured a climate favorable to the rebirth of the IRA.
Thus, the army lost the battle for hearts and minds at the start of its counter-terrorist
campaign. It should also be pointed out that the army was sent into Northern Ireland
without much direction. The British government had only one goal: to avoid having to
govern the province directly. London simply continued to pour more troops into the
province (see Table 3) to bolster the Stormont government, in the hope that the soldiers
would find a military solution to what was (and remains) a political problem, and that
order would be finally and somewhat miraculously restored. The violence that
accompanied the introduction of internment (see Table 4) and the debacle of “Bloody
Sunday” forced the British government to abolish the Stormont parliament and assume
direct control, which it maintains to this day.47
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The ad hoc nature of political and military responses was influenced by the fact that
all the participants thought that the conflict would end soon. The IRA, boosted by its
recruitment after the Falls curfew, believed victory was at hand. Britain had recently
abandoned Aden as a consequence of a terrorist campaign that resulted in the deaths of
36 soldiers. The IRA believed that if it killed the same number of soldiers, the British
government would pull out.48 The British government and sectors of the army though that
the soldiers could win a military victory over the IRA.49 By the end of the 1970s, the
participants had a clearer understanding of the situation. The IRA settled into a “long
war” strategy in 1977, and the following year a classified army intelligence document
(which the IRA obtained and published) stated that the IRA’s “campaign of violence is
likely to continue while the British remain in Northern Ireland…. We see little prospect
of political development of a kind which would seriously undermine the [IRA’s]
position.”50
The IRA has been a formidable adversary. The organization moved from car bombs
to letter bombs to sophisticated devices. In the early 1970s, while it still kept Ulster as the
focus of its activity, the IRA began to stage operations on the British mainland. From the
early 1970s, and until all terrorist organizations (Catholic and Protestant) declared a
cease-fire in 1997, the IRA periodically targeted pubs, department stores, parks, and the
financial district of London, as well as British army barracks on the European continent.
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1979), p.156. See also Taylor, Behind the Mask, pp.154, and 174. The British government was so desperate
to see an end to the conflict that in 1972 it negotiated a truce with the IRA, against the army’s advice. The
government offered the IRA what amounted to prisoner of war status in return for a cease-fire. The cease-
fire collapsed after 13 days. Years later, when the government abolished the “special status” the IRA staged
a hunger strike in the prisons that became another propaganda victory against the government. See Padraig
O’Malley, Biting at the Grave. The Irish Hunger Strikes and the Politics of Despair (Boston: Beacon Press,
1990), p.19, fn.2, p.290.
50 Brigadier J. M. Glover, Northern Ireland Future Terrorist Trends (London: Ministry of Defence,
December 15, 1978), p.18. Portions of the original document are reproduced in Roger Faligot, Guerre
Spéciale n Europe. Le laboratoire irlandais (Paris: Flammarion, 1980), pp.319-323. Interviewed by Peter
Taylor over a decade later, Glover stated that his report caused enormous displeasure, because in 1978
sectors within the government and the military still believed in a military victory. See Taylor, Behind th
Mask, pp.251-252.
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The IRA routinely attacked members of the security forces in Northern Ireland, and
occasionally killed a high profile target, such as the queen’s uncle, Earl Mountbatten. The
group almost succeeded in killing Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher at the Conservative
Party annual conference in 1984, and during the Gulf war (1991), it carried out a mortar
attack against 10 Downing Street while Prime Minister John Major presided over a
cabinet meeting.
As far as the British government and the security forces are concerned, it is the IRA
that drives security policy.  Loyalist terrorists are not perceived as constituting the same
type of threat, for a variety of reasons. Loyalist violence is reactive. It responds to IRA
violence. Loyalist have killed and bombed less frequently than the IRA (see Table 4).
More important, Loyalist terrorists confine themselves to killing Catholics, and refrain
from attacking the security forces.51
The ad hoc nature of political and military responses to violence extended to the
legal and practical definitions of the soldiers' role. In 1969, the army marched into
Northern Ireland as "military aid to the civil power" – in other words, as support to the
police. In practice, the military took over the responsibility for public order and counter-
terrorism, and the police became subordinate to the army. The RUC resented and resisted
its de facto subordinate role. As a consequence, army-police relations were strained
during most of the 1970s, and the counter-terrorist effort suffered. During this period, the
police was relegated to fighting what the Irish humorously term "ordinary decent
criminals" in Protestant areas.52 In Catholic areas, the army was the law. The army was
also in control of every aspect of counter-terrorism. It operated a system of saturation
patrolling, manned rural and urban observation posts and vehicle checkpoints, monitored
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public gatherings, carried out house searches, ran a network of informers, and
reorganized intelligence gathering.53
In 1977, the government decided to inaugurate the “era of police primacy,” not out
of a desire to democratize law enforcement. What motivated the government was the
realization that the pervasive military presence in the streets gave credence to the “army
of occupation” argument and allowed the IRA detainees to refer to themselves as
prisoners of war. The army resisted the advent of police primacy forcefully, yet for
almost a decade the change was merely cosmetic. It was only in the mid-1980s that the
police took over duties such as manning vehicle checkpoints, house searches, or the
policing of demonstrations, marches and political funerals.54 The a my continues to have
responsibility for the policing of rural areas, and of republican enclaves in cities. The
army will also intervene, at the request of the RUC, in the policing of major public
gatherings.55 On these and all other occasions, the army retains operational independence.
More important, since the mid-1980s, the army has been increasingly devoted to
undercover operations in plainclothes, and to surveillance of civilians.
Under normal circumstances, the advent of police primacy in security policy should
be considered a democratic advancement, since it will lead to a “civilianization” of law
enforcement, and to the adoption of more flexible and open public order responses.
However, according to observers of the Ulster conflict, the advent of police primacy
resulted in the “militarization” of the police, in the sense that the police s ado ted
tactics, practices and equipment borrowed from the military, and has also benefited from
the increasing secrecy clouding security operations in the province. The only real change
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that the era of police primacy seems to have brought about, is that there is now regular
consultation and cooperation between the General Officer Commanding and the Chief
Constable, extending down both chains of command.
It is easy to conclude that the term "police primacy" is a little ambiguous, and that
“the criteria for military intervention remain open to fairly arbitrary change with little
opportunity for proper parliamentary scrutiny, and the legal relationships between
soldiers, police and other civil authorities are far from clear.”56 Scholars and journalists
argue that the ambiguity in police-military relations, and the substantial autonomy with
which the police and military operate, suit the civilian officials, who can dissociate
themselves from mistakes, particularly when these result in loss of civilian life. Whether
or not this is true, there is evidence that many security decisions are made without much
civilian input, either from the Northern Ireland Office (London’s executive arm in the
province) or from the civilian body appointed to oversee the RUC.
Has the army been effective? What are the lessons that can be derived from the
army’s 30-year experience in counter-terrorism? There are two ways to answer these
questions. The first is to look at some statistics. Tables 3 – 5 provide figures on force
structure and on incidents of violence in Northern Ireland.
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Table 3 - Security Forces Personnel in Northern Ireland, 1969-1999
Year British Military UDR/RIR RUC RUCR Total RUC Total
1969 3,000 (a) ------ 3,000 (c) ----- 3,000 6,000
1970 11,243 (a) 4,008 (b)
1971 7,742 (a) 6,786 (b)
1972 14,218 January (a)
21,688 July (a)
9,074 (b) 4,200 (d) 2,500 (d) 6,700 29,992 Jan.
37,462 July
1973 16,854 (a) 7,982 (b) 4,500 (c) 2,500 (c) 7,000 31,836




1975 13,913 (b) 7,861 (b)
1976 13,672 (b) 7,769 (b)
1977 13,632 (b) 7,843 (b)
1978 13,600 (b) 7,900 (b)
1979 12,986 (c)
1980 12,141 (c) 8,000 (c) 7,000 (c) 4,500 (c) 11,500 31,641
1981 11,098 (c) 7,500 (f) 7,300 (f) 4,800 (f) 12,100 30,698
1982 10,538 (c) 7,500 (e) 8,000 (e) 2,500 (e) 10,500 28,538
1983 9,882 (c) 7,000 (e)
1984 9,090 (c) 8,000 (e) 4,405 (e) 12,405
1985 6,700 (e) 8,259 (h) 4,508 (h) 12,767
1986 10,086 (c) 6,530 (c) 8,234 (h) 4,414 (h) 12,648 29,264
1987 6,531 (h) 8,236 (h) 4,650 (h) 12,886
1988 6,393 (h) 8,231 (h) 4,649 (h) 12,880
1989 10,500 (i) 6,230 (h) 8,259 (h) 4,623 (h) 12,882 29,612
1990 10,500 (m) 6,043 (h) 8,231 (h) 4,544 (h) 12,775 29,318
1991 6,276 (h) 8,217 (h) 4,560 (h) 12,777
1992 11,000 (k) 5,417 (h) 8,478 (h) 4,593 (h) 13,071 29,488
1993 5,412 (h) 8,464 (h) 4,572 (h) 13,036




1998 12,000 (g) 5,000 (g)
1999 5,500 (h) 8,489 (l) 4,967 (l) 13,456
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Note: The Ulster Defence Regiment and the Royal Irish Rangers merged in 1992, and became the Royal
Irish Regiment. Technically the RIR is part of the Regular Army, but only serves in Northern Ireland.
Source:
(a) Michael Dewar, The British Army in Northern Ireland (London: Arms and Armour Press, 1997),
p.105.
(b) David Butler, British political facts, 1900-1979 (London and Basingstoke: The Macmillan Press,
1980), p.435.
(c) Tom F. Baldy, Battle for Ulster. A Study of Internal Security (Washington, DC: National Defense
University Press, 1987), pp.11, 106.
(d) Christopher Hewitt, The Effectiveness of Anti-Terrorist Policies (Lanham, MD: University Press of
America, 1984), p.79.
(e) Desmond Hamill, Pig in the Middle. The Army in Northern Ireland 1969-1985 (London: Methuen,
1986), pp.265, 267, 271, 273, 299.
(f) Northern Ireland: Problems and Perspectives (London: Institute for the Study of Conflict, Conflict
Studies # 135, 1982), pp.20, 21.
(g) Ministry of Defence, “The British Army in Northern Ireland – The Armed Forces in Northern Ireland.”
Available at http://www.army.mod.uk/army/world/nireland/n_armf.htm (August 13, 1999).
(h) CAIN Web Service, "Background Information on Northern Ireland Society – Security." Available at
http://cain.ulst.ac.uk/ni/security.htm (July 30, 1999).
(i) Glenn Frankel, "An Anniversary That's No Cause for Celebration," Washington Post National Weekly
Edition, August 21-27, 1989, p.15.
(j) Ministry of Defence, “The British Army in Northern Ireland – The Royal Irish Regiment.” Available at
http://www.army.mod.uk/army/world/nireland/n_roir.htm (July 30, 1999).
(k) John Strawson, "The Thirty Years Peace," in David Chandler and Ian Beckett (eds.), The Oxford
History of the British Army (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996), p.357.
(l) CAIN Web Service, “Background Information on Northern Ireland Society – Law and Order.”
Available at http://cain.ulst.ac.uk/ni/order.htm (August 5, 1999).
(m) Ronald Weitzer, Policing under Fire. Ethnic Conflict and Police-Community Relations in Northern
Ireland (Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 1995), p.74.
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1969 3 3 10 0 16
1970 15 2 5 2 24
1971 96 20 45 9 170
1972 261 111 83 17 472
1973 131 86 32 3 252
1974 144 125 19 6 294
1975 120 121 7 9 257
1976 155 114 16 10 295
1977 75 25 8 2 110
1978 56 10 10 1 77
1979 101 17 2 0 120
1980 51 14 9 6 80
1981 68 12 17 13 110
1982 83 14 12 1 110
1983 61 10 12 2 85
1984 47 7 12 3 69
1985 47 4 5 0 56
1986 39 15 5 1 60
1987 70 15 9 3 97
1988 70 23 10 1 104
1989 54 18 3 0 75
1990 52 19 10 0 81
1991 49 40 6 0 95
1992 40 38 10 1 89
1993 38 48 0 1 87
Total 1,926 (58.63%)911 (27.73%) 357 (10.87%) 91 (2.77%) 3,285 (100%)
Source: Malcolm Sutton, Bear in mind these dead … An Index of Deaths from the Conflict in Ireland 1969-
1993 (Belfast: Beyond the Pale Publications, 1994), p.206.
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Table 5 – Security Incidents in Northern Ireland, 1969-1994






1969 73 9 1 14 102
1970 213 153 17 324 305
1971 1,756 1,022 493 716 1,246
1972 10,631 1,382 471 1,259 18,819
1973 5,019 978 542 1,313 17,426
1974 3,208 685 428 1,236 11,848
1975 1,803 399 236 820 4,996
1976 1,908 766 426 736 9,849
1977 1,081 366 169 563 1,728
1978 755 455 178 393 956
1979 728 422 142 300 905
1980 642 280 120 203 821
1981 1,142 398 131 357 3,419
1982 547 219 113 288 2,298
1983 424 266 101 166 1,706
1984 334 193 55 187 3,871
1985 238 148 67 173 3,344
1985 392 172 82 174 2,443
1987 674 236 148 206 5,885
1988 538 253 205 489 4,728
1989 566 224 196 246 1,377
1990 557 166 120 179 1,969
1991 499 231 137 164 4,167
1992 506 222 149 194 2,197
1993 476 206 83 196 3,944
1994 348 123 99 178 1,285
Source: CAIN Web Service, “Background Information on Northern Ireland Society – Security.” Available
at http://cain.ulst.ac.uk/ni/security.htm (August 18, 1999), p.3.
 As Table 3 shows, over the years the conflict has involved a significant troop
commitment. There seems to have been no conscious decision, on the part of the British
government, to adjust force structure to the level of actual violence. There is little
variation in troop levels between 1972, when there were 472 deaths, and 1993, when
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there were 87. For the British government, more is always better, irrespective of the
irritant factor that the troops’ presence represents. Advocates of the use of the military in
domestic counter-terrorism should pay close attention to the figures in Tables 4-5, which
put the military’s effectiveness into question. Clearly, the highest levels of violence
coincide with the period of military primacy in counter-terrorism, and violence decreased
significantly in the era of police primacy. More important, the figures above demonstrate
that there can be no military solution to a problem that is essentially political.
Advocates of the use of the military in domestic counter-terrorism should also
consider that the British army, viewed by many as the world's most expert counter-
terrorist force, cannot do more than contain the problem. This is not necessarily what the
soldiers in Ulster believe. According to one sergeant, "[w]e've all basically got the same
idea of how we could end this, but world opinion wouldn't stand for it." A senior officer
believes that "[a] majority of officers are now strongly backing a shoot-to-kill policy as
the principal method of defeating the IRA. Otherwise we shall be marching toward an
eternity of duty in Northern Ireland."57 These statements run counter to key findings of
terrorism research. Through studies on the life histories of former terrorists we have
learnt that repression will only strengthen the individual terrorist's resolve, increase the
group’s cohesiveness, and even encourage the terrorist organization to stage further acts
of violence.58 In fact, there are only two cases, Argentina and Peru, in which military
repression succeeded in putting an end to a terrorist campaign. In both cases, this
involved massive human rights violations. In a democratic regime, these “dirty wars” are
not an option. Therefore, unless repression is conducted on such a scale that leads to the
extermination of the terrorist organization (which in a democracy cannot happen), it will
be counterproductive, since it will only stimulate more violence.
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The issue of the effectiveness of a military response to terrorism can be
approached from a different angle, by looking at the effects on military organizations and
on democratic practices. Colonel Michael Dewar, a veteran of several Northern Ireland
tours, refers to it as "a distraction" from the British army's main purpose, the defense of
Europe through NATO.59 The Ulster campaign has involved an enormous expenditure in
specialized equipment and requires a complex system of relief that disrupts army life.
The army brass initially assumed that Northern Ireland would provide useful training in
infantry tactics. However, “[n]ot only was the infantry involved; armoured, artillery,
engineer regiments, and the other corps all took their share…. We should not
underestimate the profound influence of Ulster on soldiers’ lives. This seemingly endless
commitment calls much of the tune. It conditions deployment, training, movement and
logistics; it affects morale; it shapes the soldier’s life.”60 Therefore, from the perspective
of a proper and efficient use of military resources, it would seem that the British army’s
involvement in Ulster has had mostly adverse effects.
The commitment of troops to Ulster has also negatively affected British law and
British democracy. Over the years, the British government has felt it necessary to cloud
in secrecy different aspects of the security situation in Northern Ireland. The Northern
Ireland Office has refused to make available basic data, such as the number of deaths
attributable to the security forces and to the terrorists. The Director of Public
Prosecutions has refused to make public a list of killings by the security forces that have
resulted in criminal proceedings.61 The army’s doctrine for internal security is
“unavailable for public scrutiny.”62 Even the “Yellow Card,” the one-page instruction
which tells the soldier when to use lethal force, is classified.63 The government routinely
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turns down requests for this type of information on the grounds that it would not be in the
public interest to make this information available, while in reality the very opposite is
true. Disclosure of this type of information is not only in the public interest; it is also a
vital means to achieve democratic civilian oversight of internal security policy. The
British government’s desire for secrecy has merely stimulated investigative journalists
and scholars to obtain data and documents by other means. In turn investigative
journalists have been threatened with onerous libel laws and with prosecution under the
Official Secrets Act, a draconian and, according to legal scholars, very vague piece of
legislation seeking to punish the disclosure of information pertaining to national
security.64
The government has also felt it necessary to introduce a number of legal reforms
in order to protect soldiers from criminal prosecution. Between 1969 and 1993 the
security forces killed 348 civilians and 9 soldiers engaged in undercover work. Of those
civilians killed, 154 were members of terrorist organizations and 194 were totally
unconnected with terrorist activities. These 194 individuals died because they were
mistaken for terrorists, or they were in the vicinity of a gun battle, or they were shot
during street disturbances. The RUC killed 51 civilians. The other 297 (85%) were killed
by the military.65 A very high proportion of these killings have occurred in disputed
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circumstances, “but criminal prosecutions of those responsible have been brought in only
28 cases, only two of which have to date resulted in a conviction.”66
In 1969, the army hierarchy wanted a guarantee that no soldier posted to Northern
Ireland would face criminal charges. This the government could not promise. Instead,
what has evolved is an implicit agreement between the government, the army brass and
the soldiers, that the government will try to prevent those prosecutions. It is in this
context that a number of legal reforms were introduced. Unlike the police, after an
incident that results in deaths the soldiers abandon the scene. They only submit written
statements about the incident, after extensive consultation with the Army Legal Service.
Mark Urban examined a variety of statements issued after incidents between the late
1970s and the late 1980s, and concluded that since the statements were all so similar,
they were probably not entirely truthful. In mainland Britain, whenever there is a death in
disputed circumstances, a coroner is required to call an inquest. Supported by a jury, the
coroner issues a verdict as to the cause of death, and recommends further legal action.
The relatives of the deceased and their legal counsel are entitled to question all witnesses
to the incident. However, in Northern Ireland, soldiers who have killed civilians while on
duty are exempted from testifying at inquests. Coroners' inquests in Northern Ireland are
not empowered to issue verdicts as to cause of death, or make any recommendations as to
legal action, and the juries are selected by the police. It is easy to conclude as many have
done in Ulster, that the law affords soldiers protections not available to ordinary
citizens.67 This de facto legal immunity enjoyed by the soldiers creates two different
classes of citizens – soldiers and civilians – and is a violation of the most basic
democratic principle, equality before the law. And, while the trend in democratic
societies is for an increasing transparency of government actions, and a concomitant
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increasing civilian empowerment, what the citizens of Ulster have suffered is an
increasing militarization of politics.
III. Summary: Characteristics of the Military Performance in Los
Angeles and Northern Ireland
The analysis in the preceding two sections indicates that the military participation in
law enforcement in Los Angeles and Northern Ireland shared some common
characteristics and dynamics. This section reviews those common traits.
1. All the missions undertaken by the military were traditional police missions.
In Los Angeles and Ulster, the military spent most of the time directing traffic,
conducting street patrols, manning vehicle checkpoints, conducting house searches, and
protecting commercial establishments. All of these missions are normally undertaken by
police officers. The military did not contribute any specific capabilities, nor was there
anything in the nature and dynamics of these crises that required the use of military force.
2. The military were neither trained nor equipped to perform constabulary work.
In the case of Los Angeles, the military were unfamiliar with the terrain – not only the
geography of their area of responsibility, but also the street conditions, and the public's
attitudes and reactions. Some military equipment, such as radios, did not work well in a
city environment. In Northern Ireland, the army has been forced to purchase equipment
that has no military use beyond the Ulster theater. The army has also spent considerable
resources developing training programs to teach soldiers how to behave like policemen.
And, because the army and civilian officials implicitly acknowledge that the constabulary
mission detracts from the army’s warfighting skills, an elaborate system of rotation has
been established, so that duty in Northern Ireland becomes a determining influence in the
functioning of the entire British army. This begs the question: if soldiers have had to be
re-trained to become policemen, why not train policemen in the first place?
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3. Military-police interoperability was problematic.
In Los Angeles, individual policemen and soldiers, demonstrating considerable good will
towards each other, developed good relations as they operated side by side. But incidents
such as the one described earlier, when the police requested cover and the marines
opened fire, reveal that it was difficult for these organizations, with different procedures
and equipment, to act harmoniously, particularly in the absence of any previous joint
training. In Northern Ireland, the police and army battled for control of security policy
well into the 1980s. This enmity and rivalry over which of the two organizations would
dictate the orders hampered the entire security effort.
4. The police are trained on the principle of minimum force, whereas the military
operate on the principle of maximum force.
Protesters, demonstrators and rioters can and sometimes do engage in behavior that the
penal codes term criminal, such as the destruction of property. But the criminal codes in
democratic societies never punish these actions with the death penalty. Therefore, it is
important to guarantee that, in responding to protest and riot, the security forces will not
apply the death penalty in extra-judicial fashion. Policemen routinely employ minimum
force, while soldiers are trained to employ maximum force against an identified enemy. It
is not customary in war to ask for explanations of individual deaths or woundings. In
constabulary work, it is. And while in military terms the impact of one bullet may be
negligible, the political impact of one bullet is immense. This is why policemen are, or
should be, equipped and trained in the use of non-lethal means of crowd control. Soldiers
hardly ever are. In Los Angeles, soldiers were only armed with lethal weapons, and their
only option, if persuasion failed, was to use lethal force. In Northern Ireland the soldiers
are equipped and trained in the use of lethal and non-lethal weapons. However, the high
number of fatalities in disputed circumstances, and the failure to prosecute those
responsible, has left a legacy of bitterness that will be difficult to overcome.
5. Military intervention in Los Angeles and Ulster became necessary because the police
could not cope with the situation, but constant recourse to the military hampers the
development of an adequate police force.
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The city of Los Angeles seems to be involved in a vicious cycle. In 1965, after the Watts
riots, a commission of inquiry argued that the riots had two causes: the social deprivation
in inner city areas, and the bigotry displayed by the police in these areas. Also, in 1965,
the lack of legitimacy and riot control training of the LAPD necessitated the involvement
of the California National Guard. The commission of inquiry made a series of
recommendations for change in social policy and in the behavior of the LAPD, but little
was achieved. In 1992, the same conditions that had led to the Watts riots led to the
Rodney King riots, and once more, the National Guard had to be called in. A new
commission of inquiry in 1992 made fresh recommendations on social policy and on
radical changes to the culture and processes within the LAPD. Almost a decade later,
nothing seems to have changed. In fact, over the last year (1999-2000), the media has
regaled the American public with stories about rampant corruption and excessive use of
force (with racial overtones) by the LAPD. It is easy to conclude that if another riot were
to break out in Los Angeles today, the LAPD would be paralyzed once more, and the
National Guard would have to step in.
To some extent, the same arguments about a vicious cycle can be made in the case of
Ulster. In 1969, the army was sent into the streets of Belfast because the police, which
was only 13% Catholic, lacked any legitimacy with the minority, and was overtaken by
events. Today, the RUC is one of the best-equipped police forces in the world. However,
Catholic membership in the force has plummeted to 7%, and a recent (1999) commission
of inquiry argues that the RUC is neither legitimate nor responsive to the needs of the
Catholic minority. Therefore, on the basis of the experience in Los Angeles and Ulster, it
can be said that the military may provide short-term relief to a public order crisis. But
such crises are normally the result of complex political and social problems, and
inadequate policing. Unless those problems are addressed, the military might have to be
redeployed, and becomes less of a deterrent. In addition, in Los Angeles and Ulster,
continuous reliance on the military has prevented the police from facing up to its
responsibilities.
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IV. Conclusion: Lessons and Recommendations
"No army, however well it conducts itself, is suitable for police work."68 This is a
conclusion that Colonel Michael Dewar draws from his tours of duty in Northern Ireland.
It is also one of the threads that runs through this monograph. Democratic public order is
a job for well-trained policemen, but it also requires a broad consensus within civil
society. In conclusion, this section draws some political lessons from the two cases
described, and proposes some remedies.
Lesson # 1: The time to think about public order emergencies is not when the rioters are
on the streets, but well before that. Crises are not inevitable; they can be caused by
government action, or inaction.
Civilian officials in Los Angeles in 1992 and in London in 1969 believed that they were
faced with an emergency so severe that it warranted the deployment of military forces.
This may have been the case. But it is also true that in Los Angeles and Ulster, problems
became emergencies through the actions or inaction of those in authority. In Los Angeles,
politicians had allowed social conditions to fester, in spite of the warning signs of the
Watts riots in 1965, and the verdict of the commission of inquiry, which argued that what
explained Watts was the deprivation of inner city minorities. Politicians and voters in Los
Angeles had failed to provide the funds that would have given the LAPD adequate
equipment, training, and personnel. In addition, the LAPD operated without meaningful
oversight, and the force had alienated the community of South Central. In Northern
Ireland, decades of British neglect had allowed the Protestants to turn the Catholics into
second class citizens, and the RUC into a force identified with one party to the conflict.
In both cases, the emergency might have been avoided if social and political problems
had been addressed in timely fashion. To compound the problem, civilian officials in
both cases gave little though to what should happen if the violence escalated. Confronted
with widespread rioting, they resorted to the military, provided little guidance, and
expected the military to provide a solution.
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Recommendations:
Just as other social policies, such as health or education, are widely debated in
democracies, the question "what kind of domestic security policy do we want?" is one
that should be permanently asked and debated in government, in the press, and by the
citizenry. The answer to this question will change depending on national circumstances
and resources. But the question must be addressed, and a consensus reached, particularly
in view of the potential human costs. That consensus must find expression in laws that
regulate both the behavior of the security forces and the oversight mechanisms for those
forces.  In addition, through political parties and other social organizations, citizens must
demand that their government meet its basic responsibility. Governments have a
responsibility to provide solutions to pressing social problems and to provide a public
order policy that is compatible not only with democratic values but also with the needs of
individual communities.
Lesson # 2: The police must be trained and equipped to deal with disorders in a manner
that does not exacerbate the situation, and is compatible with democratic practices.
Protest is a basic right and an inescapable fact of democratic life. Protest need not turn
violent, and develop into a riot. Experience shows that the role of the police is decisive.
The police can be prepared to adopt a gradual response, and thereby diffuse a crisis.
Conversely, the police can, by their actions, provoke increased violence.
Recommendations:
Police forces in several countries have adopted practices worth emulating. These
practices have successfully minimized social conflicts and guaranteed a balance between
the right to free expression and the right to order.
a) Adequate force structure and budgets: In Los Angeles and Ulster, one of the problems
at the start was that the police were not available in sufficient numbers, and lacked
riot control training and equipment. Therefore, an important first step is to make sure
that a police force has adequate personnel, available in sufficient numbers to deal not
only with the population’s everyday needs but also with the incidents of public
protest and mass disorder.  However, numbers are not enough. Studies of police
39
forces indicate that as soon as they face financial constraints, senior policemen make
cuts in the area of training, particularly riot and human rights training. Therefore, in
addition to a proper force structure, the police must have adequate budgets, to support
adequate training and equipment.
b) Policing protests as a labor-intensive activity: This monograph has consistently
distinguished between lethal and non-lethal means of crowd control, emphasized that
only policemen are trained in the use of non-lethal weapons, and stressed that such
non-lethal weapons are a more humane method to deal with crowds. However, some
European police forces resist the use of such technical aids, on two grounds. First,
there is a big debate over the use of plastic and rubber bullets, which are only
effective at a range between 20 and 45 meters. Plastic and rubber bullets can kill at
short distances, and are ineffective at long distances. In addition, police forces in
some European countries argue that other non-lethal means of crowd control, such as
water cannon, horses, dogs, or large shields, are too provocative. Therefore, the
preference in these countries is for the deployment of a very large number of police
officers, armed only with batons. It is assumed that those police officers will be able
to negotiate with the crowd, and that those officers armed with technical aids should
stay in the background, ready to be employed only if persuasion fails.
c) Innovations in public order management: Some European police forces negotiate with
protestors and demonstrators prior to an event.69 Th  police meet with demonstration
organizers prior to an event and assist the organizers with preparations for the march,
discussing issues such as transportation, first aid, altern tive routes. The police also
present their views, and explain the nature of their jobs, to the potential
demonstrators. In Germany, police forces have occasionally distributed flowers to the
protesters, and have sent policemen in uniform to demonstrate alongside the
protesters. In the Netherlands and Germany, the police do not limit these contacts to
the period immediately preceding a protest event. The police maintain frequent
contact with those groups such as ecology or peace groups, which they expect to have
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to police at some point in the future. In the Netherlands, these groups are routinely
invited to the training sessions of the Dutch riot police.
Lesson # 3: The police are the most visible arm of the state. The attitudes and behavior of
the police will influence what the citizens think of the social order under which they live.
Therefore, the police must at all times be held accountable for their actions.
The innovations described above are only possible if the police enjoy a relatively
harmonious relationship with the community it serves. This was not the case in either Los
Angeles or Northern Ireland, where the police had lost all legitimacy, primarily in the
eyes of the minority populations. Civilian oversight of the police is vital in guaranteeing
that this situation does not develop. Civilian oversight can also ensure that the police
comply with the laws and regulations on their behavior.
Recommendations:
Democracy is compatible with a variety of mechanisms of police control. Particular
institutions or processes have not proved more effective than others. Rather, experience
seems to indicate that the co-existence of a variety of governmental and non-
governmental controls works best. What follows is a list of different mechanisms for
control. Readers should keep in mind that what is important is not so much the institution
or process in place, but whether oversight is effectively exercised. For example, in Los
Angeles the mayor is supposed to exercise ultimate control over the police, but we know
that by the time of the riots, the mayor had not spoken to the LAPD chief for over a year.
Therefore, the mechanism was in place, but it was not employed effectively.
a) Legislatures: parliaments have the power to define the structure of the police force, its
rules of conduct, its internal disciplinary codes, its patterns of deployment, its
equipment. Parliaments also have the power of the purse. It is not enough for
parliaments to legislate on these matters. Ideally, parliamentary commissions should
also monitor that the law is being followed.
b) The locus of everyday control: in addition to the law, police forces are accountable to
civilians on a daily basis. There is enormous variation across countries, dictated by
tradition and cultural preferences. In most of the United States, the police i
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accountable to an elected official, the mayor or state governor. In continental Europe,
the police is accountable to the minister of the interior or the minister of justice
(sometimes, to both), who is assisted by civil servants. Britain (including Northern
Ireland), Japan and some large American cities subscribe to the philosophy of “police
independence.” This is the idea that the police should be accountable directly to the
law, and not to public officials identified with the political party in power. This is a
lofty ideal, but in practice, in these cases the police have been placed under the
control of civilian review boards without clearly defined powers and without
budgetary resources. The result has been an absence of meaningful control.
c) Judicial review of the use of force and police misconduct: in a variety of countries,
the police are criminally liable for misconduct and for excessive use of force. This is
a positive development that enforces the notion that the police are at all times servants
of the law. The courts also allow members of the public to obtain redress. However,
in itself this mechanism is not enough. In the two years prior to the Rodney King
incident, LAPD officers had been taken to court in record numbers, on charges of
excessive use of force, and the LAPD had paid astronomical sums in compensatory
damages. However, this did not prompt any police re-evaluation of its conduct.
d) The media and non-governmental organizations: the media and NGOs have a vital
role to play. The media can and must expose and discuss problems in the provision of
law enforcement services. NGOs are uniquely placed to conduct research, lobby
political power, disseminate information, even act as mediators between the
community and the police.
e) Internal police controls: some police forces have written codes of conduct, and
disciplinary boards designed to enforce those codes. Some scholars emphasize that
this is the best way to ensure the accountability of the police. However, the internal
review of police conduct will not do much to increase the public’s confidence in the
police.
Lesson # 4: Police organizations must develop procedures and techniques that make them
legitimate in the eyes of all sectors of society, including the ethnic minorities.
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We have seen that one of the key issues in Los Angeles and Northern Ireland has been
the persistent failure of the police to earn the confidence of the minorities they are
supposed to serve. Unless this problem is addressed, a repetition of periodic outbursts of
violence is likely.
Recommendations:
Two complimentary issues must be addressed if a police force is to enjoy harmonious
relationships with a multi-ethnic and multi-cultural community:
a) The ethnic composition of the police force: in order for the police to gain acceptance
in a multi-ethnic and multi-cultural community, the composition of the police force
must reflect the ethnic composition of the community. Efforts must be made to reduce
imbalances between the social composition of the community and that of the police.
The police must develop recruitment strategies that increase minority membership,
and must also conduct cultural awareness training of its personnel, so that retention of
minority police officers does not become an issue.
b) Community policing: Communities plagued by ethnic conflict have experimented
successfully with a new policing style70, known as community policing, alternative
policing, or neighborhood policing. Community policing is also the norm in some
countries that have not suffered major ethnic conflict.71 In community policing, the
constabulary is expected to be a constant presence in the community, and to engage
that community in creative problem solving partnerships. Community policing
requires a significant investment in time and funds, since it relies on foot patrols.
Police officers “on the beat” become a constant presence in the local schools, parks,
homeowners’ or merchants’ associations. Local police stations also formalize
contacts with the media, the NGOs, and citizens’ committees. Community policing
has proved effective in fighting crime, but more important, it has provided a constant
channel of communication with the community.
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Lesson # 5: If widespread disorder and rioting overwhelm the local police and determine
a need for reinforcements (police or military), this must occur according to well
established procedures and societally approved criteria.
In Los Angeles and Ulster, civilians called in military troops because they perceived that
the police were not available in sufficient numbers to quell the violence. This situation
might arise in other places, given that it may not be financially possible to maintain a
large police force.
Recommendations:
There are several options that do not necessarily involve military troops. Austria,
Spain and France maintain a separate riot control police. The advantage is that this force
can be deployed wherever disorder breaks out. However, critics argue that a national riot
police will apply the same techniques and the same response, irrespective of local
conditions. Germany, Portugal, Sweden and the Netherlands apply a second option. They
maintain a national riot police, and deploy this police in support of local forces. A third
option, if protest and riot policing is left in the hands of the regular police, is to deploy
reinforcements from other jurisdictions. This can happen in several ways, depending on
the organizational structure of the police. In countries with a single police directed from
the national capital, this mobilization of reinforcements can happen quickly. To some
extent, the same happens if a country has a regional police organization, directed from a
state or provincial capital. But in countries with an atomized police structure like the
United States, where there are approximately 25,000 local police forces, it will be
necessary to have pre-existing agreements, such as the Mutual Aid plan which was
bypassed in Los Angeles. Finally, there is the option of military forces.
Whichever option is selected, a plan of action must be in place well before
disorders break out. This plan should be simple and well understood by those entrusted
with carrying it out, unlike the Los Angeles emergency regulations. This plan should also
be sanctioned by community involvement. In addition, the more forces involved, the
more difficult it will be to coordinate action. Therefore, if an emergency plan
contemplates the participation of different police forces, or of the police and the military,
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there should be annual or bi-annual joint exercises. Planning and training should
emphasize a clear chain of command, and if the military are to be involved, military
subordination to the police. Planning and training, especially if the military are to be
involved, should also emphasize discussion of the appropriate use of force, and training
should also emphasize compliance with the rules of engagement, and penalties for non-
compliance.
